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This paper attempts to analyze the linkages between macroeconomic policies and economic 
growth variables, their movement over time, and their impact on poverty in the case of Poland.  
Poland, a middle-income country, is of particular interest because its data sources allow for a 
relatively detailed analysis of such developments, but also because of macroeconomic 
environment and the economic growth variables show a relatively sizable degree of variance. In 
addition, Poland has struggled in the last few years to reduce poverty while still experiencing 
positive economic growth.  The paper will show that in Poland poverty-reducing growth depends 
heavily on the ability of the economy to generate jobs.  During the early years of transition, net 
job growth was positive, but after the Russian crisis of 1998, productivity gains were 
accomplished mostly through labor shedding, consequently increasing poverty in Poland. In 
addition, the paper identifies how fiscal and social protection policies impact Poland’s income 
distribution and poverty trends.   
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dIntroduction. In 1989 the first partially free elections in Poland’s post-World War II 
history took place, and Poland became the first country in Central and Eastern Europe to 
reestablish democracy and embark on an economic and social transition to a market 
economy. A "shock therapy" program implemented during the early 1990s enabled the 
country to transform its economy into one of the most dynamic and robust in the region. 
Today, Poland’s economy is by far the largest among the new EU-member states. It 
accounts for over 50 percent of the cumulative population of the 10 new member states
1 
and also about 50 percent of their cumulative GDP. 
The beginning of Poland’s transition in 1990 was marked by exceptionally difficult 
macroeconomic conditions, which included high inflation, a large legacy of external debt, and a 
high black market foreign exchange premium.  Saddled with a large part of the enterprise sector 
that was considered “value subtracting,” Polish policymakers took huge risks by making the zloty 
convertible, fixing the exchange rate, and lowering import barriers.  With privatization lagging 
behind, many predicted a crisis based on the notion that enterprises would not be able to cope 
with market conditions, which would lead to politically unacceptable mass bankruptcy and social 
upheaval.  This did not happen.  On the contrary, Poland turned out to be unique among the large 
front-running European transition countries in having an unbroken growth record once growth 
resumed after the initial output collapse.   
This paper attempts to analyze the linkages between macroeconomic and economic growth 
variables, their movement over time, and their impact on poverty and income distribution.   
Poland, a middle-income country, is of particular interest not only because its data source permit 
a relatively detailed analysis of such developments, and also because the macroeconomic 
environment and economic growth variables show a sizable degree of variance.  In addition, 
Poland has struggled in the last few years to reduce poverty while still experiencing positive but 
subdued economic growth.   
A.  A SUCCESSFUL MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Economic growth has not been uniform over the last decade. After years of growth above 5 
percent or above in the mid 1990s, growth declined substantially to reach a meager 1 percent in 
2001, only to increase again in 2003 with good prospects for the coming years (see Figure 1 and 
Table 1). The slowdown in growth was accompanied by an increase in poverty and 
unemployment as is evident from Figure 1.  
 
This section provides a brief discussion of recent economic developments in Poland. The Polish 
Central Statistical Office’s annual Household Budget Survey (HBS) micro-data sets (1994-2002), 
as well as publicly available real sector and monetary macro data, have been used to analyze 
linkages between the macroeconomic environment on the one hand and poverty, inequality, and 




                                                 
1 The 10 new member states that joined the EU on May 1 2004 are the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Poland.  
 
  2Figure 1:  Growth, Employment and Poverty, 1994-2002 
 


































































Table 1:  Selected Economic Indicators, 1997-2003 
Source:  GUS data. 
Main macroeconomic indicators   1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
GDP growth, % y/y  6.8  4.8 4.1 4.0 1.0 1.4 3.8 
Private consumption growth, % y/y  6.9 4.8 5.2 2.8 2.1 3.3  3.1 
Gross fixed investment growth, % y/y 21.7  14.2  6.8  2.7  -9.8  -5.8  -0.9 
nemployment rate, e.o.p., %  10.3 10.7 13.8 16.3 19.4 20.0  20.0 
verty headcount, % of population  14.7 13.1 14.3 14,8 15.6 16.6  .  . 
General gov’t expenditures, % of GDP  43.5 41.9 42.7 40.5 43.3 44.0  46.3 
General gov’t budget balance, % of GDP  -2.8 -2.4 -3.1 -3.0 -4.9 -5.9  -6.6 
Consumer price inflation, % y/y 13.2  8.6  7.3  10.1 5.5  1.9  0.8 
NBP refinancing rate, %  28.0 21.0 21.5 24.0 16.5 9.75  6.0 
Current account deficit, % of GDP  -3.7 -4.1 -7.6 -6.0 -2.9 -2.6  -2.0 
External debt, % of GDP  34.6 35.2 41.6 39.8 37.7 41.7  47.6 
e.o.p – end of period, 2003 – forecast or latest available 
U
Po   
 
The Factors Behind the Trends in Growth 
While many factors can account for Poland’s growth record - including consistent economic 
policies despite frequent changes of government -  the main economic factor has been that Poland 
managed the macro-micro policy linkages well.
2 At its core, this meant maintaining a 
combination of hard budget constraints for enterprises, a competitive real exchange rate, and a 
post-privatization governance structure that allowed businesses, in particular small and medium-
size enterprises, to flourish. By reducing fiscal deficits and placing public debt on a stable and 
sustainable trajectory (including making debt reduction agreements with the Paris Club), Poland 
achieved a macroeconomic environment that was conducive to growth and that allowed a gradual 
decline in inflation (see Table 1). However, it is important to note that during the early years of 
transition the restructuring process was aided by relatively easy access to social safety net 
programs for redundant workers, and that the dismantling of the overly generous social assistance 
  3
                                                 
2 See for example, unpublished memo by Brian Pinto (2002). network of the communist era has not been tackled with the same vigor as have market-oriented 
reforms. 
The loss of export markets in the East as a consequence of the Russian crisis in 1998 costs Poland 
around 3 percentage points of GDP and triggered a new round of enterprise restructuring to 
curtail falling profitability. This time, the resulting improvements in productivity were brought 
about in large part through reducing employment. This reduction, together with the increased 
numbers of newcomers to the labor market owing to the baby boom of the early 1980s, led to 
significant increases in unemployment.  As of December 2002, over 3.3 million people (20 
percent of the labor force) were unemployed.  
These developments coincided with a shift in monetary policy in 1999, leading to the creation of 
an independent Monetary Policy Council (MPC). Inflation targeting became the main anchor of 
monetary policy, one of the means of facilitating accession to the EMU. When inflation 
rebounded in 2000 into double digits, the MPC progressively tightened monetary policy by 
raising its rediscount rate to a peak of 21.5 percent in August 2000. As a result, real lending 
interest rates increased to over 13 percent during 2001, up from around 10 percent during 1999-
2000.  In combination with possible over-investment during the high growth years of 1996-99,  
this led to a significant decline in domestic demand, and especially in investment, from the 
second half of 2000 onwards. At the same time, inflation declined impressively from 2001 
onwards to less than 1 percent in 2003.  
 
Figure 2:  GDP Growth, Export, and Industrial Performance 
Source:  Staff calculations based on GUS data. 
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The macroeconomic environment deteriorated progressively at the end of the last decade.  While 
monetary policy tightened during the second half of 2000, fiscal policy eased considerably during 
2001. Not only did the general government balance widen from –3.0 percent for 2000 to -5.9 
percent for 2002, but the structural deficit (i.e., corrected for business cycle effects) worsened by 
over 2 percent to over 5 percent of GDP by 2002 and 2003 (see Figure 3). This “tight monetary 
and loose fiscal” policy mix has additionally crowded out investment and moderated the 
potentially expansionary effect of fiscal policy. 
 
  4 
Figure 3: Fiscal and Monetary Developments, 1996-2003 
 
B.  DID POVERTY RESPOND TO GROWTH? 
It is clear that the high gro d a decline in poverty in 
Poland, which suggests high responsiveness of poverty to economic growth. From 1999 onward, 
 Statistical Artifact? 
le of growth in poverty reduction, it is important to note that household 
onsumption – as captured by the HBS – performed much more badly than the national accounts 
P 
rowth) is considered, the analysis shows a very strong link between growth and poverty 
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wth rates of the mid-1990s to 1998 facilitate
however, this responsiveness appeared to weaken; poverty began to increase even though growth 




To fully evaluate the ro
c
(NAS) would suggest, with average household consumption declining in the low – but positive --
growth years after 1998. This difference persists even when the figures for changes in aggregate 
private consumption from NAS are considered rather than GDP growth. This is not a 
phenomenon unique to Poland and may be explained by the unusually high investment 
accumulation over the 1990s, and by its relatively high export rate.
3 Reconciling these two series 
is beyond the scope of this report, but it is important to note that the HBS shows declining values 
of average per capita consumption for the period 1999 – 2002 while the NAS data show moderate 
positive growth.Thus, the estimates of poverty, which are based on the HBS, show increases in 
poverty in these years despite the positive consumption growth rates shown by the NAS data.  
 
When the responsiveness of poverty to growth in average consumption (rather than to GD
g
reduction. Over the last decade the average estimated elasticity of poverty with respect to growth 
in average consumption from the HBS data has been 3.6 with a peak of 4.11 in 1999.
4 Given 
Poland’s GDP level, this value compares very well with the estimates for other transition 
countries and with those typically found in countries outside of the region (Bruno, Ravallion, and 
  5
 
3 Adams (2003). 
4 These estimates are in line with the value of 3.5 given in World Bank (2002).   Squire,1998; Ravallion and Chen,1997).
5 To sum up: a 1 percent growth in mean consumption 
brings about a 3 percent reduction in the headcount poverty rate which is equal to about 0.5 
percent of the total population or (multiplying by 38.2 million) 185,000 people. Given the 
relatively high degree of elasticity and the optimistic predictions for growth in 2004, the 
prospects for poverty reduction in Poland are good. Assuming inequality to increase at the 
average rate experienced over the last five years, poverty should fall by 6.4 percent, lowering it 
by 1.5 percentage points to 15.1 percent in 2004 (see table 1).  
But Inequality Matters, Too 
However, inequality also rose steadily through the second 
half of the 1990s (see Figure 4).  In 2002 the Gini 
coefficient for consumption inequality was 0.28, which 
was moderately high compared to other CEE countries 
(see, for example, World Bank, 2000 and 2002). Given 
the formerly centrally planned economic systems in CEE 
countries and their subsequent economic development, it 
is not surprising that growth is associated with rising 
inequality. In general, however, CEE countries constitute 
an outlier in the overall picture – any simple universal 
link between growth and inequality has been flatly 
rejected by recent studies (see, for example, Ravallion 
and Chen, 1997).   
 
Figure 4:  Inequality, 1994-2002 
 























































0.14 Gini coeff, LHS
Mean log deviation,
RHS
Table 2 decomposes the overall inequality – measured by the Theil mean log deviation index - 
into two components: (i) differences between groups and (ii) within group inequalities. The focus 
is on variations within (and between) (i) regional groups (96 groups = 16 voivodships crossed 
with 6 town sizes), (ii) educational groups (3 groups: higher, secondary, other) and (iii) age 
categories.  If, for example, mean consumption was the same for all regions (i.e., the region 
variation was 0), then the numbers in the respective row in the table would be 0 and all inequality 
could be entirely attributed to inequalities within each region. Analogously, if everyone within a 
given region had equal consumption (i.e., within-region variation was zero) but regions differed 
in mean consumption, the “between” inequality component would be 100 percent. The table 
shows that inequality caused by variation within groups is the main component of total inequality 
for all groups analyzed. However, differences between different educational groups are 
significant and growing component of overall inequality and are differences between different 
regions. On the other hand, differences across different age groups were and remain minimal. 
 
Thus, regional inequalities clearly increased during 1994-2002, not only in absolute terms
6  but 
also in relative terms. Or, equivalently, regional inequalities rose even more than total inequalities 
and the role of regional inequalities in overall inequality increased. The increase in the primary 
education was an even more substantial signifer rising inequality. 
                                                 
5 Just to give few examples, the growth elasticity of poverty for Romania was estimated at 3 in 1996 and 
1997 but has declined since than to below 2 (World Bank, 2003). An average elasticity of 3.7 was also 
estimated for Croatia (World Bank ,2002). However, the limited information available suggests much 
lower responsiveness  in other countries. Estimates of around 2 were derived for Russia (World Bank, 
2002) and less than 1 for Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Kyrgyz Republic (World Bank, 2003). 
6 See Chapter 3 of Poland Living Standard Assessment, World Bank (2004) for a discussion of regional 
poverty and prices 
  6Table 2:  Decomposition of Theil Inequality Index (Inter-Group Inequality), 1994-2001 
    1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Theil index    0.100  0.095  0.097 0.107 0.110 0.114 0.120 0.120 
Decomposition          
     Within groups  0.092  0.087 0.089 0.097 0.097 0.100 0.104 0.106 
Regional  Between groups  0.008  0.008  0.008 0.010 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.014 
Share of  between groups  7.9%  8.3%  8.1%  9.4%  11.5% 12.5% 13.0% 11.6% 
     Within groups  0.087  0.083 0.084 0.092 0.093 0.095 0.097 0.097 
Education  Between groups  0.013  0.012  0.130 0.015 0.017 0.020 0.023 0.023 
Share of  between groups  13.0%  12.9%  13.4% 13.8% 15.9% 16.5% 19.5% 19.1% 
     Within groups  0.098  0.093 0.095 0.105 0.107 0.111 0.118 0.118 
Age  Between groups  0.002  0.002  0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
Share of  between groups  1.7%  2.2%  2.2% 2.0% 2.5% 2.4% 1.5% 1.7% 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on HBS. 
 
Generally speaking, when inequality increases (if other things are kept constant), poverty 
normally increases as well, thus dampening the beneficial effect of growth on poverty.   
Fortunately, changes in the shape of the distribution of consumption are much slower than the 
change in the mean.  Therefore, the positive growth impact should outweigh the negative effect of 
a widening of the distribution itself. 
 
Decomposing Trends in Poverty  
 
Having described the trends in growth and in inequality, it is important to analyze the effects of 
these trends on poverty. 
 
 
Table 3:  Decomposition of Changes in Poverty, 1995-2002 (percentage points) 
Poverty  change  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Total  -0.4% -1.5% -0.3% -1.6% 1.3%  0.5%  0.8%  1.0% 
Due  to  growth  0.4% -2.1% -1.1% -2.0% 0.5% 0.4% 0.6% 0.6% 
Due  to  inequality  -0.9% 0.3% 0.8% 0.5% 0.8% 0.0% 0.2% 0.5% 
Source:  Staff calculations based on GUS’s data. 
 
 
The results of a decomposition of changes in poverty for Poland into their growth and inequality 
components are presented in Table 3 and Figure 5
7  It is evident that economic growth was a main 
driving force in poverty reduction. Two periods are readily distinguishable. During Poland’s high 
growth years, 1994-98, the economic growth effect (5 percent) far outweighed the negative effect 
of the increase in inequality (-1 percent), resulting in a cumulative decline in poverty of about 4 
percentage points. During the subsequent period, 1998-2002, and because of a decline in mean 
consumption, lack of growth and increased inequality jointly resulted in a cumulative increase in 
poverty of about 3 percentage points for that period.   
 
                                                 
7 For a description of the methodology used, see Bourguignon (2002). 
  7 
Figure 5:  Decomposition of Changes in Poverty,1994-2002 
 
Note:  The 2002/1994 change is approx. a sum of 1998 –2002 and 1994-1998. 
















For further illustrative purposes, one can look at the consumption level and its dynamics at 
different parts of the consumption distribution. It is interesting to compare mean 
incomes/consumption across the ranked population. Inverting the cumulative distribution of 
consumption at a p-th percentile, one can infer consumption levels at this percentile.  This line – 
depicted in the left panel of Figure 6 – is called a quintile function, or, sometimes, a Pen’s parade 
(Pen, 1971).  For example, individuals at the 70th percentile had in 2002 a consumption level of 
almost PLN750 per month. 
 
The left panel of Figure 6 presents three curves for three different years (1994, 1998, and 2002).  
Between 1994 and 1998 the line shifted upward almost in parallel, implying a rise in consumption 
across the entire population. However, between 1998 and 2002 the line generally shifted 
downward (except for the higher percentiles). The magnitude of this decline was clearly greater 
for the lower percentiles.  The consumption level of the poor returned to, or fell below, its 1994 
level.  The right panel in Figure 6 presents the same story but from a dynamic perspective.  The 
period 1995-98 was generally favorable for all the consumption groups,
8 but in 1999 an across-
the-board deterioration emerged, with only the top quintiles maintaining a barely positive level of 
consumption growth (except in 2001). 
  8
                                                 
8 There could be two explanations for the 1997 performance of the lower quintiles IN 1997: a tightening of 
social benefits eligibility, and massive flooding in the summer.  
Figure 6:  Consumption and Growth in Mean Consumption by Percentiles/Quintiles, 1995-2002 
 
Source:  Staff calculations based on GUS data. 
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It is straightforward to extend the idea of the 
Pen’s parade to show the change in mean 
consumption (rather than ITS level) for various 
percentiles of the consumption distribution 
during the period of interest. This approach, 
which uses the so-called growth incidence curve 
(gic), is meant to show how gains from 
aggregate economic growth are distributed 
among the population.
9  Figure 7 shows growth 
incidence by percentile.  
It should be noted that there was almost no 
change in the consumption level at the 15
th 
percentile between 1994 and 2002.  However, 
the consumption level at the 90th percentile and 
higher grew by over 10 percent over this period.  
These results are consistent with what has 
already been identified.  For example, the curves 
are (almost) regularly increasing, meaning that inequality has risen at all levels of distribution. 
Figure 7: Growth Incidence Curve 
 
Note:  The 2002/1994 change is approximately a sum of 2002/1998 and 
1998/1994 
Source: Staff calculations based on GUS data. 
Growth incidence: consumption 












During 1994-98 the curve was above zero everywhere, indicating that poverty has fallen, 
whatever the poverty line and whatever (reasonable) poverty measure is adopted. Although, 
 
9 Note: The curves should not be interpreted as a growth in consumption of an average p-percentile Mr. X 
during that period.  The cross-sectional character of the exercise implies that the graph rather depicts the 
difference in mean consumptions of two groups of individuals that happen to be in the same percentile at 
both ends of the period of interest.  We are comparing the poor in year A with the poor in year B, not 
asking whether they are the same people, thus (leaving aside mobility within the distribution) we 
underestimate the improvement for individual poor people and overestimate the growth of rich people.   
  9technically speaking, the growth could be described as moderately pro-rich (higher growth at the 
higher quintiles), it brought significant benefits to the poor as well. During 1998-2002, the 
situation changed radically: only the highest decile managed to maintain its consumption level 
and the reduction was hardest for the poorest percentiles. 
In addition to the discussed indicators, Ravallion and Chen (2003) derive an intuitive, 
straightforward index to measure pro-poor growth:  it is equal to mean growth (change in 
consumption) for the poor:
10  
  
) ( ) (
) (
0
h dp p gic
h
p Π = ∫
Π
γ
    
where  ) (h Π  is a percentile where 
the poverty line is drawn (equal to the poverty headcount).  
This index can then be compared with an average growth to infer whether the growth is pro-poor.  
Table 4 presents the comparison. 
 
Table 4:  Pro-poor Growth 
Growth 1995 1996 1997 1998  19999  2000 2001 2002 
Average  -0.7% 3.5%  2.1%  4.2% -0.9% -0.9% -1.0% -1.0% 
Pro-poor  0.3% 3.2% -0.9% 3.2% -2.1% -2.8% -2.3% -2.1% 
Source:  Staff calculations based on GUS data. 
 
 
C.  WHAT IS BEHIND THE INCREASE IN CONSUMPTION INEQUALITY? 
 
Changes in inequalities in consumption can be the result of a number of factors. Four important 
ones are: (i) changes in the distribution of original income; (ii) changes in the progressivity of the 
tax and benefit system; (iii) changes in the distribution of savings; and (iv) changes in relative 
prices of the basket of goods bought by households at different points along the income 
distribution. Unfortunately, the Polish HBS has very limited information on household savings. 
Thus, the analysis below focuses on the  other three factors identified above. 
 
Changes in the Distribution of Original Income and its Components.  
 
Original income refers to the income that the household has before paying taxes and receiving 
benefits (other than old-age pensions). As shown in Table 5, over the period 1994-2002 inequality 
in original income, as measured by the Gini coefficient, increased by around 7 percent, from 0.38 
in 1994 to 0.41 in 2002. The increase was surprisingly moderate considering the degree of 
transformation the country had experienced, particularly since it occurred entirely after 1998 with 
inequality in original income fluctuating around a stable value in the high growth years of 1994-
98.  
 
Table 5 also shows the main sources of inequality and the main factors behind the increase. 
Inequalities in labor income were and remain, a major source of total income inequality. In 
addition their relative role in overall inequality has increased over time until 2001 (from 70.5 
percent to 72.3 percent) although it appears to have declined back to 70 percent in 2002.
11 The 
combination of increased inequality and the growing size of the component attributable to labor 
                                                 
10 This index, as Ravallion and Chen (2003) note, has an additional desirable property of being based on an 
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11 The nature of a decline in 2002 is not clear. 
  10income dispersion resulted in a increase in the concentration coefficient for this component 
income of 8 percent between 1994 and 2002, higher than for overall income and for any other 
component.  
 
To conclude, an important source of the increase in inequality of consumption over the 1994-
2002 period as discussed above can be found in the growth of inequality in original income. The 
main force behind this increase has been the growth of inequality in labor income, with is 
reflected in both a higher concentration coefficient for this type of income and the increased role 
played by this component in the overall measure of inequality.  
Table 5:  Income Inequality and Decomposition by Income Sources, 1994-2002 
Gini  Coefficients:  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Original Income*  0.379  0.377  0.386 0.395 0.366 0.377 0.395 0.395 0.407 
      o f   w h i c h :              
     Labor income  70.5%  68.9%  70.8% 71.6% 72.1% 73.7% 74.1% 72.3% 69.9% 
     Old age pension  15.1%  16.5%  15.9% 16.0% 16.4% 16.4% 15.3% 17.8% 18.8% 
     Income from farm   10.1%  11.6%  9.3% 8.9% 7.6% 6.4% 6.2% 5.7% 6.6% 
     Other income  4.3%  3.0%  4.1% 3.5% 3.9% 3.5% 4.4% 4.3% 4.7% 
Disposable Income**  0.308 0.304 0.312 0.323 0.293 0.298 0.311 0.308 0.317 
Concentration Coefficients***: 
Labor Income  0.389  0.382  0.396  0.402 0.377 0.398 0.420 0.414 0.421 
Old age pension  0.394  0.408  0.404 0.410 0.380 0.385 0.372 0.407 0.423 
Income from farm  0.332  0.358  0.326 0.371 0.290 0.273 0.292 0.287 0.338 
Other income  0.307  0.254  0.320  0.289 0.293 0.265 0.304 0.280 0.295 
Method:  Decomposition of the Gini coefficient into components, ranking by total income. 
*     Before taxes and benefits. 
**   After taxes and benefits 
*** Household ranked by original income. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on HBS. 
The Role of Taxes and Social Benefits 
While increased inequality in original income is clearly an important component of the dispersion 
of consumption, it is not the full explanation. As the second part of Table 5 shows, the growth in 
the Gini coefficient for original income (7 percent) was just over half of the increase in the Gini 
coefficient for consumption (13 percent). Thus, other factors must be at play. Amongst these 
factors, of potential importance are changes in the tax and benefit system which, for any given 
distribution of original income, may affect the distribution of the income that households actually 
have to spend (i.e., their disposable income).  
The top section of Table 6 shows that the concentration index for taxes increased by 32.8 percent 
in the period 1994-2002, which suggests that the tax burden has become more concentrated. At 
the same time, the social benefits system evolved toward the poor more strongly. This would 
suggest that since the mid-1990s changes in the tax and benefit system have counteracted the 
increased inequality in original income, leading to a much smaller growth of inequality in 
disposable income (only 3 percent, from 0.308 to 0.316). 
  11Table 6:  The Role of Taxes and Social Benefits in Inequality Trends, 1994-2002 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Concentration  Coefficients*:            
Taxes  0.311 0.307 0.318 0.328 0.322 0.367 0.386 0.400 0.413 
Benefits  -0.270 -0.316 -0.318 -0.334 -0.374 -0.367 -0.371 -0.365 -0.362 
Progressivity**:           
Taxes  -0.070 -0.072 -0.071 -0.069 -0.045 -0.012 -0.010 0.002  0.004 
Benefits  -0.650 -0.695 -0.707  -0.71  -0.72  -0.746 -0.767 -0.762 -0.771 
Method:   
*   Household ranked by original income. 
** Kakwani index. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on HBS. 
An alternative way of looking at the effect of fiscal policy on poverty is to consider its 
redistributive effect. This can be done by comparing the Lorenz curve for original income with 
the concentration curves for taxes and benefits. Figure 8 compares the redistributive impact of the 
system in 1998 and 2002. The comparison points to some interesting conclusions. The first 
surprising result is that in 1998 the concentration curve for taxes dominated the Lorenz curve for 
original income (i.e., it was above the Lorenz curve for all points in the income distribution).  
This suggests that the overall tax system was regressive (i.e., that the poor paid more than  the 
better-off as a proportion of their income). However, since the distance between the two curves 
was very small, the magnitude of the redistribution involved was very limited. In 2002 the 
situation for the poorest individuals had not changed. The share of taxes that they paid exceeded 
their share of income, which pointed to a redistribution away from the poor. However, in 2002 
the concentration curve for taxes crossed the Lorenz curve, making impossible to derive firm 
conclusions about the overall level of redistribution.  
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It is in cases like this that it becomes important to use an index of progressivity such as the 
Kakwani index, which measures (twice) the area between the Lorenz curve for pre-tax income 
and the concentration curves for tax liabilities and received benefits.
12 Table 6 above gives the 
values of the Kakwani indexes for taxes and benefits over the period 1994-2002. These values 
  12
                                                 
12 Kakwani (1977). confirm the intuitive conclusions derived from Figure 8. In 1994 the Polish direct tax system was 
slightly regressive but the degree of regressiveness declined over time until the system became 
slightly progressive in 2001. The benefits system, on the other hand, was always highly pro-poor 
and grew increasingly so over the period under consideration (the Kakwani index increased by 
nearly 2 percent). However, much of the change occurred between 1994 and 1998 (an increase of 
14 percent). 
The latter is a most interesting result, as it suggests that households are increasingly dependent on 
social transfers to finance their consumption expenditures. Although work income is the most 
important source of financing for expenditures, it clearly varies across the expenditure 
distribution (see Figure 9).  For 2002, its share varies from 41 percent for the first decile to 68 
percent for the tenth decile. Even for the bottom quintiles, income from work remains the main 
source of financing consumption expenditures (see Figure 10). 
Figure 9:  Comparison of Income Composition: by Decile in 2002 (left) 
















Source:  Staff calculations based on GUS data. 
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Figure 10:  Poverty and Social Transfers, 1994-2002 
 
 
Source:  Staff calculations based on GUS data. 
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  13However, Figure 10 shows that the number of people relying on social transfers to close their 
poverty gap increased steadily after 1998, approaching 20 percent in 2002. This means that   
headcount poverty would have been 20 percentage points higher if social assistance had not been 
available as a safety net. 
Even though social transfers (excluding old age pensions) have a direct poverty reducing effect, 
the system is extremely costly and inefficient.  Calculations based on Household Budget Surveys 
estimate the total amount of social transfers in 2002 at 6.3 percent of GDP, which is close to what 
government statistics report.  However, 56 percent of this amount (or 3.6 percent of GDP) is not 
reaching the poor:  26 percent is in excess of the amount necessary to bring household 
consumption to the poverty line level (called “overflow”), while 30 percent (an equivalent of 2 
percent of GDP) goes directly to non-poor households (see the left-hand panel of Figure 11).  
Although benefit tightening has been tried on several occasions, the amounts leaking were of a 
similar order of magnitude throughout the analyzed period.   
Figure 11:  Targeting of Social Transfers (Excluding Old Age Pensions) 
Source:  Aut
strates the incidence of social transfers (excluding old age 
and inefficient system for 
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The right-hand panel of Figure 11 illu
pensions) from an ex post rather than an ex ante perspective and reveals a disturbing pattern:  
there is very little difference in the actual nominal per capita amount of social transfers across the 
expenditure distribution.  Whatever quintile is evaluated, whether rich or poor, each (equivalent) 
individual receives on average 120-140 PLN per month. And all deciles except the 9
th and 10
th 
receive higher per capita transfers than the poorest decile. If these resources were applied with 
perfect targeting, rather than being spread more or less uniformly over the distribution, they 
would be more than double the amount needed to eradicate poverty . 
The conclusion, therefore, has to be that Poland has a costly 
distributing social transfers; less than half of which serves to bring household consumption up to 
the poverty line level.  A major proportion of these resources is not going to the most needy.  
However, it might be the case that poverty reduction is not the only objective of this 
redistribution, i.e. some of the transfers serve an insurance function and are not necessarily 
designed to improve the well-being of the poorest. Another 
 
  14 objective – given the even spread of these resources – could be the improvement of the well-
being of the “median voter” in order, for example, to win support for government policies and 
maintain social consensus. 
Inflation and Exchange Rate Movements and Expenditure Composition   
It should be borne in mind that inflation is a regressive tax, the burden of which is typically borne 
disproportionately by the poor.  For example, the poor tend to hold most of their financial assets, 
if any, in the form of cash.  In addition, when inflation reaches a certain threshold it negatively 
affects investment and output growth and therefore reduces employment opportunities.  The 
composition of inflation is also frequently regressive: for example, it is well known that food 
prices often tend to rise faster than the overall CPI – a situation that disproportionally affects 
poorer households. Large exchange rate depreciations also tend to hurt the poor more than others, 
as, again, their consumption basket tends to contain a larger component of tradables than that of 
richer households; moreover, such depreciations normally negatively affect inflation. 
The composition of food and non-food expenditures changed somehow between 1998 and 2002 
(see the left panel of Figure 12) with every income group spending less of its consumption on 
food in 2002 compared to 1998.  During this period the food price index changed 15 percentage 
points less than the overall CPI (right panel of Figure 12), indicating that less of one’s income 
needed to be used to provide for one’s daily bread and butter.  Apparently, the income effect 
outweighs the substitution effect.  The divergence in average and food price indexes means that 
food prices remain important in poverty measurement.
13  
Figure 12:  Composition of Food and Non-food Expenditures and CPI and Food Price 
Developments, 1998-2002 
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The same situation applies to developments in the real effective exchange rate and the 
composition of tradables versus non-tradables in each decile’s expenditure pattern (see Figure 
13).  The appreciation of the zloty during the latter part of the period induced all expenditure 
groups to spend less on tradables and more on non-tradables, indicating once again that the 
income effect dominates the substitution effect. 
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13   For further discussion of this issue, see Chapter 3 of Poland Living Standard Assessment, World Bank 
(2004). Figure 13:  Composition of the Expenditures of Tradables versus Non-tradables and REER 
Development, 1998-2001 
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D.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the first section we argued that macroeconomic stability is a key component of a growth-
promoting environment and therefore, is indirectly a foundation for any successful poverty 
reduction strategy.  The link is that macroeconomic stability encourages investment and promotes 
productivity growth and employment creation.  In this sense, macroeconomic stability is a public 
good.  Since the late 1990s Poland’s macroeconomic environment has been relatively volatile 
and, unfortunately, characterized by inappropriate loose fiscal/tight monetary policy mix. 
A labor-shedding restructuring of firms that was not matched with an environment conducive to 
employment creation by the private sector (particularly by small and medium enterprises) on the 
demand side, as well as unchecked access to social safety nets and the recent baby boom on the 
supply side, have contributed to a dramatic worsening of labor market conditions, a consequent 
rise in unemployment, and a resulting increase in poverty. 
A return to robust growth (the main factor in poverty reduction) requires a stable macroeconomic 
environment with a balanced fiscal-monetary policy mix.  To prevent the re-emergence of 
economic imbalances, fiscal consolidation and the reduction of overall deficits are needed to 
complement the monetary easing since 2000.  A parallel reduction in the size of the government 
budget would provide greater space for private sector development.  Together with an additional 
and necessary redirection of government expenditures from consumption to investment, these 
policies would significantly strengthen Poland’s growth prospects. 
In order for growth to be poverty-reducing, the link between economic development and labor 
market improvement must be strengthened significantly (or perhaps simply re-established).  In 
other words, the growth environment must be made more labor-friendly.  In the short to medium 
term this would involve a necessary reduction in the tax wedge (payroll taxes) as well as an 
increase in the flexibility of the labor market.  In the longer run, policies are needed that will 
close the mismatch of skills between labor demand and supply, which means promoting 
investment in human capital and education.  Recent World Bank studies, particularly the Public 
  16Expenditure and Institutional Review (World Bank, 2003) and the Labor Market Study (World 
Bank, 2001), have explored the agenda and the prospects for policy reforms in these areas.  Their 
recommendations are still applicable. 
Price stability is an essential component of a poverty reduction policy.  Inflation predominantly 
hurts the poor, who have little opportunity to protect their assets.  For this reason, Poland’s low 
inflation in general, and particularly its low food price inflation should be perceived as a genuine 
achievement of recent years.  In addition, the decline in nominal and real interest rates brought 
about by the monetary easing should work to the advantage of the poor by increasing their 
capacity to smooth consumption. 
Fiscal policy works best if it is pro-poor.  Since the poor have a higher propensity to spend, 
leaving more resources with them during hard times provides an effective tool against cyclical 
downturns of the economy, contributes to the well-being of the vulnerable, and feeds back 
positively to overall macroeconomic stability. 
The tax component of fiscal policy appears to perform its anticipated stabilization role. Any 
changes in the system to improve its pro-poor impact should be considered carefully, so that they 
do not further increase the distortions that taxes bring to the economy, and especially to ensure 
that they do not increase the overall tax burden.  The elimination of exemptions (tax expenditures 
are directed mainly toward the rich) complemented by an overall reduction in payroll taxes in at 
least a budget neutral way is a plausible recommendation. 
Although Poland’s system of social transfers plays an important role in poverty reduction it is 
more than costly and inefficient.  Over half of the resources used is not going to the most needy.  
If these funds were targeted properly, rather than being spread more or less uniformly over the 
entire consumption distribution, they could more than eradicate poverty.  Therefore, improving 
the targeting of social transfers is an immediate necessity. Poor targeting not only leaves many of 
the vulnerable without the help of the state; it also skews incentives to work and poses a 
significant burden on government finances. 
As has been demonstrated, Polish society is still changing.  The Polish economy is growing but at 
the same time becoming more polarized. Therefore, there is a strong case for good poverty/social 
monitoring that involves going beyond aggregations and applying more complex analytical tools, 
such as various decompositions, growth incidence, benefit incidence, etc.  Such monitoring can 
provide both the public and policymakers with a better knowledge of whether and how society is 
changing, and  the ability to identify the sources of such changes.  It can also make it possible to 
assess winners and losers, and, in particular, it can become a basis for judging whether current 
and future inequalities are acceptable. Moreover, an ex ante assessment of the impact of social 
programs on income distribution and poverty could become a valuable policy tool. 
Despite a very  modestly positive GDP growth of about 1 percent in 2001 and 2002, poverty has 
been increasing.  In 2003, Poland stands at the threshold of EU accession with all its related 
challenges and opportunities, while at the same time economic recovery is accelerating.   
Therefore, actions are required to improve the pro-poor impact of economic growth and to make 
this growth work for Polish society in general and for its poor in particular.   
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